Since audit trails are stored in the BSM
binary format, several built-in tools are available to modify or
convert these trails to text. To convert trail files to a
simple text format, use praudit
. To reduce
the audit trail file for analysis, archiving, or printing
purposes, use auditreduce
. This utility
supports a variety of selection parameters, including event
type, event class, user, date or time of the event, and the file
path or object acted on.
For example, to dump the entire contents of a specified audit log in plain text:
#
praudit /var/audit/
AUDITFILE
Where AUDITFILE
is the audit log
to dump.
Audit trails consist of a series of audit records made up of
tokens, which praudit
prints sequentially,
one per line. Each token is of a specific type, such as
header
(an audit record header) or
path
(a file path from a name lookup). The
following is an example of an
execve
event:
header,133,10,execve(2),0,Mon Sep 25 15:58:03 2006, + 384 msec exec arg,finger,doug path,/usr/bin/finger attribute,555,root,wheel,90,24918,104944 subject,robert,root,wheel,root,wheel,38439,38032,42086,128.232.9.100 return,success,0 trailer,133
This audit represents a successful
execve
call, in which the command
finger doug
has been run. The
exec arg
token contains the processed command
line presented by the shell to the kernel. The
path
token holds the path to the executable
as looked up by the kernel. The attribute
token describes the binary and includes the file mode. The
subject
token stores the audit user ID,
effective user ID and group ID, real user ID and group ID,
process ID, session ID, port ID, and login address. Notice that
the audit user ID and real user ID differ as the user
robert
switched to the
root
account before
running this command, but it is audited using the original
authenticated user. The return
token
indicates the successful execution and the
trailer
concludes the record.
XML output format is also supported and
can be selected by including -x
.
Since audit logs may be very large, a subset of records can
be selected using auditreduce
. This example
selects all audit records produced for the user
trhodes
stored in
AUDITFILE
:
#
auditreduce -u
trhodes
/var/audit/AUDITFILE
| praudit
Members of the audit
group have permission to
read audit trails in /var/audit
. By
default, this group is empty, so only the root
user can read audit trails.
Users may be added to the audit
group in order to
delegate audit review rights. As the ability to track audit log
contents provides significant insight into the behavior of users
and processes, it is recommended that the delegation of audit
review rights be performed with caution.
Audit pipes are cloning pseudo-devices which allow applications to tap the live audit record stream. This is primarily of interest to authors of intrusion detection and system monitoring applications. However, the audit pipe device is a convenient way for the administrator to allow live monitoring without running into problems with audit trail file ownership or log rotation interrupting the event stream. To track the live audit event stream:
#
praudit /dev/auditpipe
By default, audit pipe device nodes are accessible only to
the root
user. To
make them accessible to the members of the audit
group, add a
devfs
rule to
/etc/devfs.rules
:
add path 'auditpipe*' mode 0440 group audit
See devfs.rules(5) for more information on configuring the devfs file system.
It is easy to produce audit event feedback cycles, in
which the viewing of each audit event results in the
generation of more audit events. For example, if all
network I/O is audited, and
praudit
is run from an
SSH session, a continuous stream of audit
events will be generated at a high rate, as each event being
printed will generate another event. For this reason, it is
advisable to run praudit
on an audit pipe
device from sessions without fine-grained
I/O auditing.
Audit trails are written to by the kernel and
managed by the audit daemon, auditd(8).
Administrators should not attempt to use
newsyslog.conf(5) or other tools to directly rotate
audit logs. Instead, audit
should
be used to shut down auditing, reconfigure the audit system,
and perform log rotation. The following command causes the
audit daemon to create a new audit log and signal the kernel
to switch to using the new log. The old log will be
terminated and renamed, at which point it may then be
manipulated by the administrator:
#
audit -n
If auditd(8) is not currently running, this command will fail and an error message will be produced.
Adding the following line to
/etc/crontab
will schedule this rotation
every twelve hours:
0 */12 * * * root /usr/sbin/audit -n
The change will take effect once
/etc/crontab
is saved.
Automatic rotation of the audit trail file based on file
size is possible using filesz
in
audit_control
as described in Section 17.3.2.1, “The audit_control
File”.
As audit trail files can become very large, it is often
desirable to compress or otherwise archive trails once they
have been closed by the audit daemon. The
audit_warn
script can be used to perform
customized operations for a variety of audit-related events,
including the clean termination of audit trails when they are
rotated. For example, the following may be added to
/etc/security/audit_warn
to compress
audit trails on close:
# # Compress audit trail files on close. # if [ "$1" = closefile ]; then gzip -9 $2 fi
Other archiving activities might include copying trail files to a centralized server, deleting old trail files, or reducing the audit trail to remove unneeded records. This script will be run only when audit trail files are cleanly terminated. It will not be run on trails left unterminated following an improper shutdown.
All FreeBSD documents are available for download at https://download.freebsd.org/ftp/doc/
Questions that are not answered by the
documentation may be
sent to <freebsd-questions@FreeBSD.org>.
Send questions about this document to <freebsd-doc@FreeBSD.org>.